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As one would expect, John Hick’s latest book is honest, bold, lucid, down 
to earth and lively. With his usual clarity, Hick has produced an accessible 
introduction to key questions in philosophy of religion, this time suitable 
for A-level and undergraduate students and interested non-specialists. 
The book familiarises readers with subjects as wide-ranging as realism and 
irrealism, mind-brain identity and mind-body dualism, neuroscience, 
telepathy, Kabbala and Sufi mysticism, and much else besides.
Between Faith and Doubt takes the form of a dialogue between John 
himself, and David, an imaginary physicalist friend. Two other characters 
participate briefly in the dialogue: Donwi, an amalgamation of Don 
Cupitt and Dewi Phillips, and Grace, an ‘ordinary’ churchgoer whose 
initial questions serve as a catalyst for John’s introduction to historical 
biblical criticism, but who later champions the integrity of religious praxis 
as a counterbalance to John’s rationalist approach to religious belief.
Chapter one outlines religious and materialist worldviews. David 
provides three possible explanations for religion (Durkheim’s, marx’s 
and Freud’s). John argues that materialism is itself a form of faith because 
it is intensely believed but cannot be proved. The relationship between 
science and religion is discussed.
In addition to these topics, the discussion of subjectivity in this 
chapter may also be useful to students. John defines ‘subjectivity’ as 
occurring in our consciousness and only accessible to the experiencer, 
making the point (often not grasped by students) that all experience 
(including religious experience) is subjective, but that this does not 
render it erroneous or inauthentic.
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In chapters two and three, John and David join forces in debunking 
the ontological and designs arguments and classical theism. In chapter 
two, John argues that even if a version of the design argument did work, 
it would not entail the God of religion. In chapter three, John rejects 
classical theism, partly due to reservations about the coherence of 
‘omnipotence’, ‘omniscience’, and ‘infinite person’, and partly because 
divine intervention would render God responsible, by omission, for 
non-averted suffering. A distinction is made between intercessory prayer 
(which assumes an arbitrary God), and loving-kindness meditation on 
someone’s behalf. (While John rightly attributes this to buddhism, it is 
interesting that a similar idea is found in Hick’s own Quaker tradition, 
expressed as ‘holding someone in the light’.)
John puts forward the idea that there are many gods (also called 
angels or devas) who can influence us via the psychic or mental network 
through which we are all connected. When people pray they are 
sometimes talking to these gods, though, equally, they are sometimes 
simply experiencing hallucinations. John also argues that Judaism, Islam 
and Christianity do not describe the same deity, and are therefore three 
distinct but overlapping monotheisms.
Chapter four contrasts non-realism and physicalism (on the one 
hand) and realist religion (on the other) in their views of the afterlife. John 
points out that denying an afterlife is bad news for humanity as a whole 
since most people are prevented from fulfilling their potential in this 
life by oppression, poverty, lack of opportunities, and premature death. 
Donwi counters that even people born into the worst circumstances have 
‘their share of life and love and beauty’ and that we should not write off 
any life as not worth living (p. 37).
In chapter five, John notes that his own philosophy is rooted in 
religious experience. like many others’, John’s religious experiences 
involved a sense of the goodness and friendliness of, and unity with, the 
rest of reality. like David, John thinks that religious experience can be 
illusory, but John cites Teresa of Avila’s criterion of the fruits or ‘jewels’ of 
an experience for discerning whether it is real. Against this, David points 
out that some illusions (e.g. placebos) can have a positive effect.
In chapter six, John sets out to explain why he thinks that people are 
entitled to trust their religious experiences. Disagreeing with Dawkins’ 
claim that the existence of God is a scientific hypothesis, he argues that it 
is rather a fundamental belief, like the belief that other people exist. The 
belief that others exist is based on sensory experience; religious belief 
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is based on religious experience. It is rational to trust our experiences 
unless there is reason to distrust them. David argues that religious 
experiences are untrustworthy because, unlike sense experiences, they 
are not i) compulsory; ii) universal; iii) uniform. John replies to i) and ii) 
by outlining the idea of epistemic distance, which, he argues, can be 
applied to both theistic and non-theistic traditions.
Chapter seven is about why religious experience is not uniform. 
John argues that critical realism provides a  way by which we can see 
different, seemingly-contradictory, religious experiences as authentic 
responses to the same ultimate reality. The ultimate is unknowable, but 
we experience its phenomena according to our existing categories. The 
findings of neurological experiments on meditatives and contemplatives 
from different traditions are cited as evidence.
David raises the objection that pluralism is antithetical to each of the 
religions themselves. John concedes that pluralism is unacceptable to 
the  leaders of the religious organisations, but argues that it is present 
in  the religions’ mystical strands.
John suggests that the authenticity of a  religious tradition can be 
gauged by the extent to which its adherents are transformed from self-
centredness to other-centredness. While this is unquantifiable, all major 
religions seem roughly successful (or unsuccessful), and so all are equally 
valid responses to the ultimate.
Chapters eight and nine concern whether neuroscientific experiments 
that produce religious experiences prove that religious experiences are 
inauthentic, or simply show that they have a neural correlate. Chapter 
eight looks at mind-brain identity, the mystery of consciousness, 
Popper’s principle of falsification, and determinism. Chapter nine 
focuses on whether drug-induced experiences can be regarded as 
mystical experiences, and whether they demonstrate that religious 
experiences are illusory.
Chapter ten explores the implications of John’s philosophy for 
Christianity. John outlines the historical critical problems with 
traditional Christianity, such as contradictions between the different 
resurrection narratives, suggesting that the disciples saw visions of Jesus 
rather than a physical appearance. Grace argues that the creed should not 
be seen as a list of propositions to which believers assent but, rather, as 
a declaration of belonging to a community that is part of a two thousand 
year old tradition.
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John argues that rejecting the incarnation is necessary because belief 
in the incarnation is (he contends) linked to Christian exclusivism. This 
is because the incarnation ‘means that Christianity alone among the 
religions of the world was founded by God in person.’ (p. 107).
In chapter eleven, John discusses frequently ignored non-conservative 
movements within Islam: liberal intellectual Islam (particularly 
Abdulkarim Soroush) which stresses the mediated, contextualised 
nature of the Qur’an, and Sufi mysticism. He agrees that the majority of 
muslims are less egalitarian, but points out that, globally speaking, most 
muslims are poor and ill-educated, and therefore accept what the imams 
tell them.
Chapter twelve concerns whether religion has had a  harmful or 
beneficial effect on the world. John distinguishes between religious 
organisations (which have a  mixed record) and the inner experiential 
aspect of religion. David raises the problematic connection between 
right-wing religion and right-wing politics in the uSA, and John agrees, 
citing the ‘heretic trials’ he underwent, and more extreme discrimination 
suffered by some of his friends. John argues that religious wars and terrorist 
attacks tend to be political rather than genuinely religious, and suggests 
that, of all the major religions, buddhism has had the least violent past.
Chapter thirteen outlines the problem of evil, the free will defense, 
person-making theodicy, the value of epistemic distance, and the appeal 
to an eschatological resolution. Among other objections, David argues 
that there is an excess amount of suffering for soul-making which a good 
God would not allow. John responds that, in order for the world to be 
person-making, we must not be able to see that it is person-making.
In chapter fourteen, John says that he does not believe in life after 
death on the basis of evidence such as spiritual mediums, though he is 
open to the possibility of a ‘psychic factor’ that persists after someone’s 
death, and believes in telepathy (or eSP). John’s belief in life after death 
is rather an inference from his religious understanding of the universe: 
‘Human existence must be a  project, not a  dead end’ (p. 150). John 
posits reincarnation (on this or other planets) as the most plausible 
model of afterlife for person-making, though he is sceptical of memories 
of previous lives. The continuant is not memory, but the dispositional 
structure formed by the karmic process. David points out that this means 
the mortality of our present conscious selves and John agrees, saying that 
we need to think of ourselves as ‘like runners in a relay race, each passing 
the torch onto the next’ (p. 158).
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In chapter fifteen, John characterises the religious outlook as one 
that is pessimistic about the present, but optimistic about the future. He 
argues that, in being an atheist, David is missing out on having the benefit 
of a sense of the ultimate goodness of the universe. They conclude that 
the reason they disagree is not intellectual but experiential: John bases 
his outlook on religious experience (including but not limited to his 
own) while David does not have religious experience as part of his ‘data’.
Between Faith and Doubt is explicitly intended for atheists and 
agnostics (ix). equally, however, it would be of interest to people within 
a religious tradition who wish to think through their faith, or to people 
who affirm a spiritual dimension but who do not belong to a particular 
tradition. Despite the intended atheist/agnostic audience, the book does 
not seem straightforwardly to be an apologetic, as is shown by the fact 
that David is not converted to John’s beliefs by the end. While John’s 
beliefs and experiences receive rather more attention than David’s, 
the overall tone is one of mutual respect combined with a recognition 
of the teleological ambiguity of the universe.
Between Faith and Doubt is a pedagogical treasure trove. The chapters 
are short, making them manageable for students and non-academics. 
The dialogue format draws the reader in. It also imparts Hick’s approach 
to philosophy of religion as investigation and dialogue rather than attack 
and defence, setting a good exploratory tone. Individual chapters would 
be suitable for reading in a classroom or seminar context as a springboard 
for a discussion of the topic. As with all his works, Hick’s enthusiasm for 
the subject is likely to inspire most students. This is in combination 
with the humility inherent in his writing, which may encourage students 
lacking confidence to articulate their own views. In contrast to most 
other accessible philosophy of religion books, the non-neutral stance and 
very personal engagement makes it difficult for apathetically inclined 
students to sit on the fence.
The book is primarily intended for non-specialists. At the same time, 
established philosophers and theologians who read it will be rewarded 
by an up-to-date account of Hick’s ever-evolving beliefs. Between Faith 
and Doubt also shows how Hick’s specific personal experiences (religious 
experience, being subject to a  heresy trial, witnessing a  spiritualist 
séance) have influenced his thinking.
The book is nicely produced. The quality of writing and editing is 
high. The cover image, a  dramatic blue and yellow astrological scene, 
is compelling and mirrors a major theme of the book: physicalist and 
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religious interpretations of an ambiguous cosmos. An index and 
endnotes are provided. In keeping with the book’s overall light touch, the 
index is simple to use, but more than sufficiently detailed for the general 
readership for which it is intended.
It would not be in the spirit of Hick’s work or person to discuss his 
latest book without critically engaging with some of his arguments and 
ideas (as they are presented here).
First, John does not address David’s point that an illusion (such as 
a placebo) can nevertheless produce a positive effect. This is a problematic 
omission because the same point could be applied as a criticism to John’s 
rule that a religion is a valid response to the ultimate if its ‘fruits’ include 
transformation from self-centredness to other-centredness. Here, John 
seems to me to be erroneously conflating what is helpful (personally 
transforming) with what is true (a valid response to the ultimate, and 
a reflection of the religion’s truth value).
Second, John sees a necessary connection between the incarnation 
and Christian exclusivism where, I  argue, none exists (there is no 
contradiction in believing that Jesus is divine and that the other religions 
are equally valid responses to the ultimate reality). Perhaps there is 
a  suppressed premise in John’s argument (i.e. that a  religion founded 
by a  divine person is likely to be less ‘mediated’ and contextualised, 
and thus more true, than a religion founded by a non-divine person). 
However, this premise is not self-evident, particularly when the matter is 
complicated by the divine person also being fully human (and so limited 
and contextualised).
Third, and relatedly, John characterises incarnational Christianity as 
believing that ‘God came down from heaven to earth in the person of 
Jesus to found a new religion – Christianity’ (p. 107). This is a simplistic 
and rather Docetic caricature of Christian theology. It also overlooks the 
fact that most modern Christians agree that Jesus did not wish to found 
a religion separate to Judaism. That Paul, not Jesus, was the founder of 
Christianity, and that Jesus remained a Jew throughout his life, is now 
well recognised among most Christians.
Fourth, John offers no evidence for his claim that, in order to be 
person-making, we must not be able to see that the world is person-
making (p. 143). The claim is not self-evidently true, and it might equally 
well be argued that the person-making quality of suffering would be 
more likely to be actualised if the sufferer were aware that that was its 
purpose. The claim also calls into question the person-making potential 
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of suffering in the case of Hick and others who accept his theodicy (since 
they ‘see’ that the suffering is soul-making, and that makes it less so).
Fifth, it seems to me that there are some unresolved issues about 
basing religious belief on religious experience. In John’s and others’ 
cases, the religious experience occurred once the subject already had 
a religious outlook. While this does not necessarily discredit the religious 
experience (though an interesting question is raised about whether they 
are ‘seeing with the eyes of faith’ or exhibiting a confirmation bias), it does 
imply that the experience cannot be the basis of the belief or outlook, 
because the belief or outlook occurred prior to it.
These and other issues mean that there is a great deal in this book for 
readers to get their teeth into. Between Faith and Doubt is undoubtedly 
a  valuable contribution to accessible philosophy of religion literature, 
and a worthy addition to Hick’s phenomenal corpus.
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like many other philosophers writing today, Paul moser believes that 
God’s existence is hidden, at least for some people at some times, meaning 
that God’s existence “fails to be not only obvious but also beyond 
cognitively reasonable doubt” (p.  1). In this book, moser presents an 
original approach to divine hiddenness and explores the implications 
of this approach for religious epistemology. He argues not only that 
hiddenness fails to rationally support a skeptical attitude to divine reality 
but also that a proper understanding of divine purposes in self-revelation 
should lead us to expect hiddenness. The book’s central thesis is that we 
should expect conclusive evidence of God’s existence to be purposively 
available – that is, available in a way that “accommodates the distinctive 
purposes of a perfectly loving God.” Such purposes, says moser, “would 
aim noncoercively but authoritatively to transform human purposes to 
agree with divine purposes, despite human resistance of various and 
sundry sorts” (p. 2). on moser’s account, then, God is hidden from some 
people at some times because such people, through their unwillingness 
